Family appeals dismissal of jail death lawsuit

The family of a 20-year-old man who took his life while an inmate in the Oneida County jail has brought their case to the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago.

On Aug. 28, the family of Gavin Wallmow filed an appeal challenging U.S. District Judge James D. Peterson’s May ruling dismissing their federal lawsuit against Oneida County and four named corrections officers.

In the suit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin in March 2022, the family alleged that “deliberate indifference” to serious medical conditions and failure to properly monitor jail detainees resulted in Gavin’s death by suicide in July 2021.

The county and corrections officers filed a motion to dismiss the case and Peterson ruled in their favor. 

“Because Wallmow was a detainee (he was incarcerated on a probation hold), not a convicted prisoner, his claims are governed by the objective reasonableness standard under the Fourteenth Amendment,” Peterson wrote in an opinion and order dated May 18. “Plaintiff’s claims against the individual officers turn on whether a reasonable officer in the defendant’s position would appreciate the risk that Wallmow would seriously harm himself. Two days before he died, Wallmow made disconcerting statements in an interview with his probation agent: he said that he wanted to drive his car into traffic and told his probation agent that she was ‘talking to a dead man.’ But plaintiff has not adduced evidence that any member of jail staff knew about those specific statements. Jail staff knew that Wallmow had demonstrated strange behavior during the interview. But strange behavior, without more, would not lead a reasonable officer to believe that an inmate is suicidal. As for the claim against the county, plaintiff has not shown that jail staff had notice that their screening and cell check procedures were so plainly inadequate that they created an obvious risk that inmates would seriously harm themselves.”

While the corrections officers were aware that Wallmow was “acting strangely and saying demonic things,” Peterson concluded those statements were “too vague to give a reasonable officer notice that Wallmow would harm himself.”

 “As the court of appeals has repeatedly held in the Eighth Amendment context, bizarre behavior alone does not put officers on notice that an inmate is suicidal,” he noted.

The Wallmow family responded to the court’s ruling by announcing that an appeal would be forthcoming.

In his appeal brief, plaintiff’s attorney Paul Kinne argues that Peterson “misapplied the Fourteenth Amendment standard.”

“A pretrial detainee’s right to be free from physical harm inflicted by others in the institution arises under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” Kinne wrote. “To state a viable Fourteenth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant made an intentional decision regarding the conditions of their confinement; (2) those conditions placed the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (3) the defendant’s decision was objectively unreasonable; and (4) the defendant’s decision caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Throughout its decision, the District Court misapplied the Fourteenth Amendment standard, requiring Wallmow to demonstrate that the Officers were aware of facts that would have led a reasonable officer to believe that there was a substantial risk that Wallmow was suicidal. Wallmow is not required to prove that a reasonable officer with the Officer’s knowledge of Wallmow’s behavior would believe there was a substantial risk he was ‘suicidal,’ —  all that is required is that Wallmow demonstrate a reasonable officer would believe there was a substantial risk he would suffer serious harm.”

 “An objectively serious medical condition can create a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate’s health or safety,” he continued. “Therefore, even if a reasonable officer in these circumstances would not have believed there was a substantial risk Wallmow was suicidal, the Officers may still be culpable under the Fourteenth Amendment if a reasonable officer would believe there was a substantial risk Wallmow would suffer serious harm.”

“Officers cannot turn a blind eye to the activities of an inmate,” Kinne argues. “An officer’s failure to discover additional information may be willful blindness if there is evidence that the officer took affirmative steps to avoid learning the information. Even if an officer does not know the specifics of the incident that posed a significant risk to the inmate, they may still be liable if they were aware of a serious risk of harm in ‘some form.’ In fact, a jury could find that the vague nature of an inmate’s complaint makes it even more incumbent on the officer to investigate further. It is disputed how many specific details of Wallmow’s interaction with (his probation officer) the Officers were made privy to, but they were provided sufficient information to be aware that Wallmow presented a serious risk of harm in ‘some form.’ None of the Officers followed up with Wallmow, (the probation officer), or with other officers to evaluate the health and safety of Wallmow, which according to (a case cited in the brief), is evidence of unreasonableness.”

Further, Kinne argues that the District Court erred in its conclusion that Oneida County’s cell-check policy, “which, in effect, allowed inmates to hang cell coverings and obstruct officers’ view of their cells,” was constitutionally adequate. 

“While Oneida County’s actual cell-check policy may not have been inadequate, the County acquiesced to a practice of constitutionally insufficient cell checks which presented a significant risk that inmates would harm themselves,” the attorney wrote. “Viewing the facts and inferences in a light most favorable to Wallmow, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the Officers violated Wallmow’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and that Oneida County’s policy was constitutionally inadequate. Therefore, Wallmow respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment for the (officers).”

In his ruling, Peterson conceded that the two officers who were responsible for surveillance of the pod where Wallmow was being housed “were not models of diligence.”

“Despite (another corrections officer’s) note in the muster, it does not appear that (the two officers monitoring Wallmow) made any special effort to ‘keep an eye’ on Wallmow,” the judge wrote. “They conducted only their scheduled visual cell checks, which were not thorough. And they did not stop Wallmow from obscuring his bottom bunk, even though inmates are not allowed to hang anything off their beds. But failing to follow instructions or enforce prison policy does not itself amount to a constitutional violation. Because a reasonable officer in (their) position would not appreciate the risk that Wallmow would harm himself, their decisions about how they monitored Wallmow did not violate his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.”

After the lawsuit was filed, Oneida County sheriff Grady Hartman stated that Wallmow’s death was a tragedy and jail officials would “vigorously defend” their actions.

“We feel badly that Gavin Wallmow chose to take his own life. However, we plan to vigorously defend our actions in this lawsuit,” he said.

The county has until Sept. 27 to respond to the appeal brief.

Heather Schaefer may be reached at [email protected].